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SPACE, THE FINAL FRONTIER OF
ENTERPRISE: INCENTIVIZING ASTEROID
MINING UNDER A REVISED INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK
Jack Heise*

Introduction
The Restaurant at the End of the Universe, a novel by Douglas Adams,
describes a torture device called the Total Perspective Vortex. This virtual
reality machine permits the being inside to grasp, for an instant, “the entire
unimaginable infinity of creation” and their size within it, denoted by a “mi1
croscopic dot on a microscopic dot, which says ‘You are here.’ ” The resulting sense of insignificance and smallness has the power to completely
2
annihilate a sentient being’s brain.
Humans occupy and harness the resources of a miniscule percentage of
the known universe. Stated broadly, the exploration of the universe presents
challenges of both physics and engineering. The former refers to limits
based on our current understanding of physics: travel at or faster than the
3
speed of light, for example, would violate the general theory of relativity.
The latter describes challenges with respect to building the instruments that
do not defy the laws of physics and ought to be possible to create.
Asteroid mining—the extraction of raw materials from rocks in outer
space—is a problem of engineering rather than physics. This endeavor both
depends upon and tends to facilitate an increasingly robust industry of space
exploration, tourism, and utilization of outer space resources–a collective
4
group of business entities termed the “space economy.” Various studies
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1.
Douglas Adams, The Restaurant at the End of the Universe 70 (1980).
2.
Id. at 77.
3.
Put plainly, this Theory posits that “as an object approaches the speed of light,
its mass reaches infinity. So, in other words, a spacecraft couldn’t physically go as fast as
light.” Elizabeth Howell, Engage Warp Drive! Why Interstellar Travel’s Harder Than It
Looks, SPACE.COM (May 7, 2018), https://www.space.com/40507-interstellar-space-traveland-science-fiction.html.
4.
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE SPACE ECONOMY AT A
GLANCE 2007, at 13 (2007) (defining the space economy as: “All public and private actors
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show asteroid mining to be possible and even financially lucrative. Private
sector companies are scrambling to tackle this challenge, with the goal of
6
extracting water to be used in space to sustain life and used as propellant.
Because this propellant would be available in space, it ameliorates one challenge of space travel, which is the extraordinary cost associated with
launching each pound of cargo. By removing the need to carry all fuel associated with the voyage at the point of launch, asteroid mining could dramat7
ically reduce the cost of space travel.
The existing international legal framework governing asteroid mining is
8
a product of the Cold War era. The Outer Space Treaty (the “OST”) prohibits “national appropriation” of celestial objects like asteroids “by claim
9
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” A
literal reading of this passage tends to prohibit the practice of asteroid mining. The OST does, however, posit that “the exploration and use of outer
10
space for peaceful purposes” is in the common interest of all mankind.
While the terms of the OST prohibit asteroid mining, it is an endeavor that
is wholly within the spirit of the treaty as a practice that tends to facilitate
space travel.
This Note argues that the OST should be modified to provide explicit
permission for private entities to engage in asteroid mining while maintaining the principles of international peace and cooperation that the treaty espouses as the core of the framework governing outer space. Part I explores
the current state of asteroid mining with reference to the current objectives
of companies conducting missions in this realm. Part II examines the OST
as applied to the enterprise of asteroid mining by private companies. Part III
considers the benefits and drawbacks of various regulatory schemes to govern asteroid mining. It argues for a solution based on the historical development of the whaling industry that retains the principles and international
character of the OST while still incentivizing asteroid mining.

involved in developing and providing space-enabled products and services. It comprises a
long value-added chain, starting with research and development actors and manufacturers of
space hardware . . . and ending with the providers of space-enabled products . . . and services . . . to final users.”).
5.
See, e.g., KECK INST. FOR SPACE STUDIES, ASTEROID RETRIEVAL FEASIBILITY
STUDY (2012), http://kiss.caltech.edu/final_reports/Asteroid_final_report.pdf.
6.
See infra Section I(a).
7.
See infra Section I(c).
8.
See Loren Grush, How an International Treaty Signed 50 Years Ago Became the
Backbone for Space Law, VERGE (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/27/
14398492/outer-space-treaty-50-anniversary-exploration-guidelines.
9.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 2, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
10.
Id. pmbl.
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I. The Who, What, How, and Why of Asteroid Mining
The premise of asteroid mining at first glance may not seem like it
needs further explanation: the point is to extract material from big rocks in
space. However, the nature of the actors involved in this endeavor warrants
discussion given the difference between the spacefaring climate as the framers of the OST saw it and the present one. Moreover, the objective of asteroid mining companies—providing fuel and materials in space—tends to reduce costs associated with launch. Reduced launch costs facilitate space
travel, in and of itself an evident purpose of the OST; facilitated space travel, in turn, could deliver substantial benefits to all mankind, furthering an11
other stated purpose of the OST.

A. The Business of Asteroid Mining
A casual Internet search for asteroid mining is likely to turn up sky-high
dollar value estimates of asteroids. From Neil deGrasse Tyson saying that
12
asteroid mining will make the first trillionaire, to a Goldman Sachs note
stating that a single asteroid could contain $25–$50 billion worth of plati13
num relative to a $2.6 billion cost of an asteroid-grabbing spacecraft, to
reports that NASA is sending a probe to an asteroid worth $10,000 quadril14
lion, the profit element of this enterprise is not lost on observers. However,
these estimates depend on the extraction of metals like platinum, their return
to Earth, and sale at the current market price, which, as the aforementioned
Goldman Sachs note concedes, would “crater the global price of plati15
num . . . .”

11.
See id. (stating “the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,” as well as the belief that “the exploration
and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the
degree of their economic or scientific development . . . .”).
12.
Joanna Rothkopf, Neil deGrasse Tyson Reveals How the World’s First Trillionaires
Will Make Their Fortunes, SALON (May 4, 2015), https://www.salon.com/2015/05/04/
neil_degrasse_tyson_the_first_trillionaire_will_be_whoever_figures_out_how_to_mine_aster
oids.
13.
Jim Edwards, Goldman Sachs: Space-Mining for Platinum Is ‘More Realistic Than
Perceived,’ BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/goldman-sachsspace-mining-asteroid-platinum-2017-4.
14.
Brid-Aine Parnell, NASA Will Reach Unique Metal Asteroid Worth $10,000 Quadrillion Four Years Early, FORBES (May 26, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bridaineparnell/2017/05/26/nasa-psyche-mission-fast-tracked/#5dfa4f754ae8.
15.
Edwards, supra note 13. Asteroid mining companies have a “ready made market if
[they] take[] advantage of the fact that it costs roughly $20,000/Kg to launch something in to
space[,]” not to mention that the “costs [of] getting a Kg of platinum just from orbit to ground
level are pretty high . . . .” Alex Hern, If You’re Going to Mine in Space, the Last Thing to Do
Is Bring Minerals Back Down to Earth, NEW STATESMAN AMERICA (Jan. 23, 2013), https://
www.newstatesman.com/technology/2013/01/if-youre-going-mine-space-last-thing-do-bringminerals-back-down-earth.
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Instead of attempting to mine metals, the initial step in asteroid mining
proposed by Planetary Resources, the most prominent asteroid mining com16
pany in existence today, is to mine asteroids for water. By making propellant available in space, asteroid mining “increases the payload capacity of
rockets, enables the creation of a space highway with fuel depots located at
various points of need throughout the Solar System, and allows spacecraft to
17
travel much farther.” In other words, the business of asteroid mining, at
least in its infancy, is not about harvesting valuable metals and returning
18
them to Earth, but rather about providing raw materials to enable the
growth of the space economy.
The impetus to provide in-space materials to the space economy is a
matter of physics. Launching an object into space is expensive: SpaceX’s
Falcon 9—with the capacity to carry just over 50,000 pounds of payload in19
to low Earth orbit —costs an estimated $36.7 million to launch and uses
20
between $200,000 and $300,000 in fuel each trip. If asteroid mining companies were able to provide some of the propellant in space, that would not
only reduce fuel costs, but would reduce the overall launch weight, freeing
21
up more space for payload.
In sum, should asteroid mining companies be able to provide fuel in
space, it could dramatically reduce the costs of transporting rockets and cargo into space—both into low Earth orbit and to more distant targets, like
Mars. Having this infrastructure in place could also reduce the long-term
costs of the asteroid mining business itself, given that the business model
involves launching objects into space. While a 2012 study estimated the to22
tal cost of an asteroid retrieval mission at $2.6 billion, a substantial reduc23
tion in launch costs would result in meaningful savings. This model of as-

16.
Products, PLANETARY RESOURCES, https://www.planetaryresources.com/products
(last visited Nov. 28, 2018); see also Why Asteroids, PLANETARY RESOURCES, https://
www.planetaryresources.com/why-asteroids/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
17.
Products, supra note 16.
18.
Planetary Resources does see mineral extraction as a long-term goal; however,
there is currently an emphasis on providing construction materials to the in-space economy.
See id. (stating that metals extracted from asteroids “will be used for in-space manufacturing
of high-end electronics, laboratory equipment and spacecraft components.”).
19.
Falcon 9, SPACEX, http://www.spacex.com/falcon9 (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
20.
Peter B. de Selding, SpaceX’s Reusable Falcon 9: What Are the Real Cost Savings
for Customers?, SPACENEWS (Apr. 25, 2016), http://spacenews.com/spacexs-reusable-falcon9-what-are-the-real-cost-savings-for-customers.
21.
See id. (noting that for reusable rockets, “[r]eserving fuel in the first stage for
landing adds mass to the vehicle and deprives it of performance, effectively carrying
fuel instead of extra payload . . . .”).
22.
KECK INST. FOR SPACE STUDIES, supra note 5, at 13, 40–41.
23.
Id. at 13 (noting that “[t]he recurring cost for subsequent [asteroid capture and return] missions is estimated at approximately $1B so subsequent missions would improve that
cost savings to a factor of 20.”).
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teroid mining as a provider of in-space resources, then, can facilitate the
growth of the space economy: future forays into space would have their
24
costs greatly reduced by a “space highway with fuel depots.”

B. Public and Private Actors in the Asteroid Mining Space
Both private companies and the space agencies of sovereign governments bear mentioning in a full discussion of asteroid mining. The role of
the private sector in space has expanded substantially in the past decade,
leading some commentators to suggest that the private sector has eclipsed
25
the public sector in this arena. The asteroid mining industry, as detailed
above, both depends upon and tends to facilitate this development. Sovereign space agencies, by contrast, conduct a waning share of activity in space
and increasingly operate by way of public-private partnerships as an inves26
tor in the space economy. This marks an important shift from the factual
backdrop of the original OST in that private, independent companies are increasingly taking the wheel.
As explored above, the asteroid mining business facilitates the growth
of the space economy by reducing launch costs. However, the future of asteroid mining as a lucrative industry also depends upon the existence and
growth of a robust space economy. The symbiotic relationships that could
develop between private companies deserves emphasis. The viability of asteroid mining depends on a space economy to which asteroid mining companies can sell fuel and metals: the lack of a current market in asteroid resources should resolve itself “when the space population hits critical mass,
27
28
demanding infrastructure.” For spaceflight companies, a crucial compo29
nent to reduce costs is access to propellant in space.

24.
Products, supra note 16.
25.
See, e.g., Kristin Houser, Private Companies, Not Governments, Are Shaping the
Future of Space Exploration, FUTURISM (June 12, 2017), https://futurism.com/privatecompanies-not-governments-are-shaping-the-future-of-space-exploration (noting the substantial expansion of the space economy in recent years and the shift toward the private sector);
The New Space Race, ECONOMIST (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/
21735023-events-space-reflect-those-back-home-new-space-race (describing the growing role
of the private sector in space).
26.
See Elton Lossner, The New Space Race, HARV. POL. REV. (May 26, 2017), http://
harvardpolitics.com/covers/the-new-space-race/; see also Thomas Heath, Space-Mining May
Be Only a Decade Away. Really., WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/space-mining-may-be-only-a-decade-away-really/2017/
04/28/df33b31a-29ee-11e7-a616-d7c8a68c1a66_story.html?utm_term=.bc9e52036305.
27.
Heath, supra note 26. The “space population” referred to in this article includes
space travelers—tourists and scientists—as well as satellite companies. See id.
28.
SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic are among the best-known companies
that seek to send people into space. See generally Monica Grady, Private Companies Are
Launching A New Space Race – Here’s What To Expect, PHYS.ORG: CONVERSATION (Oct. 3,
2017), https://phys.org/news/2017-10-private-companies-space.html. Satellite companies like
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Sovereign governments continue to play a significant, albeit declining,
role in the space economy. NASA’s share of the national budget decreased
30
from 4.4% in 1966 to 0.5% in 2014. Its current strategy centers on partnership with the private space economy: “NASA helps mitigate financial risk,
while the private sector conducts research and innovation more efficiently
31
than NASA can . . . .” Similarly Luxembourg, which lacks its own space
32
agency, opened a 200 million Euro fund in 2016 to bring asteroid mining
33
companies to the country. Planetary Resources has availed itself of opportunities offered by both NASA and Luxembourg, performing contract work
34
with the former and securing funding from the latter.
While sovereign governments do hold some of the purse strings relevant to asteroid mining companies and the space economy as a whole, pri35
vate companies are increasingly displacing national space agencies. A pri-

Société Européenne des Satellites, based in Luxembourg, also require launch services to place
their devices into orbit and could thus benefit from reduced launch costs. See Dana Hull,
SpaceX Launches Satellite for SES in Its 11th Mission This Year, BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-04/spacex-launches-satellite-for-ses-inits-11th-mission-this-year.
29.
Asteroid Mining Is The Key To Our Future Expansion Into Space, PLANETARY
RESOURCES (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.planetaryresources.com/2017/11/asteroid-miningis-the-key-to-our-future-expansion-into-space/ (noting that “Earth’s gravity well is so deep
that the cost of bringing propellant from Earth to fuel that economy in space will be prohibitive.”).
30.
Lossner, supra note 26. In the 2019 fiscal year, NASA received 0.4% of the total
federal budget. Kimberly Amadeo, NASA Budget, Current Funding, History, and Economic
Impact, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/nasa-budget-current-funding-and-history3306321 (last updated Sept. 7, 2018).
31.
Lossner, supra note 26.
32.
Aerospace Industry, GRAND DUCHY LUX., http://www.luxembourg.public.lu/en/
investir/secteurs-cles/industrie-aerospatiale/index.html (last updated Mar. 21, 2018).
33.
Approximately $227 million US. David Z. Morris, Luxembourg to Invest $227 Million in Asteroid Mining, FORTUNE (June 5, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/05/luxembourgasteroid-mining.
34.
See David Coldeway, Planetary Resources Mines Luxembourg for $28M in Asteroid Hunting Funds, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 3, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/11/03/
planetary-resources-mines-luxembourg-for-28m-in-asteroid-hunting-funds; Planetary Resources Moves Closer to Mining Asteroids, PLANETARY RESOURCES (July 15, 2015), https://
www.planetaryresources.com/2015/07/planetary-resources-moves-closer-to-mining-asteroids.
35.
See, e.g., Loren Grush, How the Private Space Industry Could Take Over Lower
Earth Orbit—and Make Money Off It, VERGE (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/
2018/2/16/17014176/nasa-iss-commercial-space-industry-budget-2025-privatization (“NASA
hopes to transition the domain of lower Earth orbit . . . to the commercial space industry over
the next seven years.”); Sintia Radu, The Global Race to Space, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2018-08-27/60-yearsafter-nasa-a-global-space-race (noting that “experts say the future of space activity may rest
with private corporations . . . .”); Alan Yuhas, The New Space Race: How Billionaires
Launched the Next Era of Exploration, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2018), https://
www.theguardian.com/science/2018/feb/09/new-space-race-billionaires-elon-musk-jeff-bezos
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vate space economy that is increasingly independent from sovereign governments tends to undermine the factual framework upon which the original
36
OST relied. Specifically, Article VI assigns responsibility for nongovernmental entities to national governments, the implicit assumption like37
ly being that private entities would be acting at the behest of a sovereign.
This concern is increasingly unsubstantiated in an environment in which
38
private, independent companies are ascendant.

C. Global Benefits of Asteroid Mining
Asteroid mining has the potential to facilitate space travel, an outcome
39
the OST holds to be in the interest of humanity as a whole. The potential
of asteroid mining to reduce the cost of spaceflight, moreover, could facilitate the growth of the space economy. Asteroid mining thus aligns with another stated purposes of the OST in the sense that an expanded space econ40
omy could provide substantial benefits to all mankind. First, in seeking to
face the challenges posed by space travel, the public sector space race gave
rise to numerous technological innovations, ranging from LEDs to emer41
gency blankets to memory foam. It seems likely that the private space race
would result in a similar degree of innovation, the products of which could
benefit people across the globe.
Second, a successful mission to Mars could provide benefits beyond a
mere sense of interplanetary accomplishment. NASA suggests that, given
the parallels between the formation and evolution of Mars and Earth, a voyage there could help “us learn more about our own planet’s history and fu42
ture.” The scientific advancements from such a mission cannot currently

(quoting Jeff Manber, CEO of the space company Nanoracks: “We’re finally reaching the
point where there’s a robust marketplace . . . . It won’t just be on the one pillar of governmentorganized or government-funded.”).
36.
See Jason Krause, The Outer Space Treaty Turns 50: Can It Survive a New Space
Race?, ABA J., Apr. 2017, at 44 (noting that the OST is a “product of the Cold War and primarily addresses concerns of that era, including nuclear war[,]” and that at that time “only the
United States and Soviet Union were even capable of launching vehicles into space . . . .”).
37.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6.
38.
See articles cited supra note 35.
39.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at pmbl. (“[T]he common interest of all
mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes . . . .”).
40.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at pmbl.
41.
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, NASA, https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/infographics/
infographic.view.php?id=11358.
42.
NASA’s Journey to Mars, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/content/nasas-journey-tomars (last updated Aug. 7, 2017).
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be anticipated and are difficult to predict, but “expand[ing] the frontiers of
43
knowledge” in this manner could well bring benefits to all mankind.
Third, the development of asteroid mining technology could also help
advance asteroid diversion tactics. The development of the technology required to conduct successful asteroid mining operations could “help us to
44
divert any incoming asteroids.” This is of great importance since NASA
45
recently eliminated its Asteroid Redirect Mission due to funding cuts;
NASA’s project was hailed by some scientists as a “critical step in demon46
strating we can protect our planet from a future asteroid impact . . . .” Asteroid mining could step in and fill an important void. While the probability
of an Armageddon-causing impact is low, the effects of an impact would be
47
extremely severe. Even some mitigation of this risk as a byproduct of asteroid mining would be a benefit to humanity as a whole.
Finally, reduced launch costs could facilitate measures to combat global
climate change. One proposed solution for canceling out predicted increases
in average worldwide temperature is to “prevent[] . . . about 1% of incoming
solar radiation—insolation—from reaching the Earth. This could be done by
scattering into space from the vicinity of Earth an appropriately small frac48
tion of total insolation.” Asteroid mining could facilitate such measures in
that “[t]echnologies that could greatly decrease the cost of space-launch

43.
NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., FY 2017: AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, at
20 (2017).
44.
Ian Sample, Asteroid Mining: US Company Looks to Space for Precious Metal,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2013, 2:40), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/jan/22/spacemining-gold-asteroids. The Keck study, supra note 5, at 11–12, states the synergies asteroid
mining would have with planetary defense as 1) developing “reliable robotic anchoring capability[,]” 2) “structural characterization, especially of the surface layers[,]” 3) understanding
the “dust environment[,]” and 4) “[t]echniques for proximity operations and NEO [near-Earth
object] navigation . . . .”
45.
Jeff Foust, NASA Closing Out Asteroid Redirect Mission, SPACENEWS (June 14,
2017), http://spacenews.com/nasa-closing-out-asteroid-redirect-mission.
46.
Geoff Brown, NASA Plans to Test Asteroid Deflection Technique Designed to Present Earth Impact, PHYS.ORG (July 4, 2017), https://phys.org/news/2017-07-nasa-asteroiddeflection-technique-earth.html (referring to the Double Asteroid Redirection Test program, a
part of the Asteroid Redirection Mission).
47.
See Milton Kazmayer, Long Term Effects of an Asteroid Impact on Earth, SEATTLE
PI, https://education.seattlepi.com/long-term-effects-asteroid-impact-earth-4601.html (last
visited Nov. 28, 2018) (“A massive asteroid impact would create long-term changes in the
atmosphere and climate of the planet. Upon impact, vaporized dirt and rock would fill the atmosphere, blocking sunlight and creating a state of near-permanent darkness and winter-like
conditions . . . . [A] large asteroid, one at least five kilometers in diameter, could cause
enough damage to threaten life on this planet.”).
48.
EDWARD TELLER ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING AND ICE AGES: I. PROSPECTS FOR
PHYSICS-BASED MODULATION OF GLOBAL CHANGE 2 (1997). In other words, this method
proposes reflecting incoming sunlight back into space by sending material from Earth into
orbit to block that sunlight, thus reducing the incoming amount of heat that would warm the
Earth’s surface.
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could make a telling difference in the practicality of all types of spacedeployed scattering systems of scales appropriate to insolation modula49
tion.” There are certainly intermediate measures to combat climate change
that ought to be taken first, but asteroid mining would facilitate this expedited solution. While some of the benefits of asteroid mining would doubtless
accrue primarily to those nations with asteroid mining companies within
their borders, the benefits noted in this section—space exploration as a general proposition, technological and scientific development, improvement of
asteroid diversion technology, and facilitated means of swiftly countering
climate change—would inure substantially to the benefit of all mankind.

II. The Legal Ambiguities of the Outer Space Treaty
The emergence of asteroid mining as a feasible business possibility presents a legal question: whether asteroid mining by private companies is legal under the OST, which prohibits “national appropriation . . . by means of
50
use or occupation” of “celestial bodies . . . .” The United States endorsed
the view that asteroid mining is legal under existing international law
through the passage of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness
51
Act of 2015. Luxembourg similarly sanctioned asteroid mining with its
52
own legislation. On the other hand, Russia and Brazil are both of the opinion that asteroid mining “constitute[s] de facto national appropriation[,]” in
53
violation of the OST.

49.
See id. at 7.
50.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2.
51.
U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, § 402(a)
129 Stat. 704, 721 (2015) (“A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an
asteroid resource or a space resource . . . shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space
resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or
space resource obtained according to applicable law, including the international obligations of
the United States.”). The bill subsequently states, “It is the sense of Congress that by the enactment of this Act, the United States does not assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive
rights or jurisdiction over, or ownership of, any celestial body.” § 403, 129 Stat. at 722.
52.
See Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de
l’espace [Law of July 20, 2017 on the exploration and utilization of space resources],
MÉMORIAL A N° 674 DE 2017 (enacted July 28, 2017) (Lux.).
The authoritative French version begins by stating “Les ressources de l’espace sont susceptibles d’appropriation,” or in English, “Space resources are capable of being appropriated.” It
goes on to state that “L’exploitant agréé ne peut exercer l’activité . . . qu’en conformité
avec . . . les obligations internationales du Luxembourg,” which is a mandate that the operator
may only perform the activity “in accordance with the international obligations of Luxembourg.” This highlights an interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty that appropriation of space
resources is not in violation of international law.
53.
Kyle Evanoff, The Outer Space Treaty’s Midlife Funk, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.:
INTERNATIONALIST (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/blog/outer-space-treatys-midlifefunk; see also Mark Kaufman, Luxembourg’s Asteroid Mining is Legal Says Space Law Ex-
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Article II of the OST states, “Outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sover54
eignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” The treaty
further provides that individual countries “shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space . . . whether such activities are
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities” and
must further “assur[e] that national activities are carried out in conformity
55
with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.” Taken together, these
provisions provide the textual basis for arguing that asteroid mining by private companies is either permissible under or in violation of the OST.
International law provides an interpretive framework relevant for answering this question that places emphasis on the purpose of treaties. The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the “Vienna Convention”) provides principles for the interpretation of treaties. For the purposes of asteroid mining, the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention and is
thus not bound by its terms; nevertheless, the United States “considers many
of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to consti56
tute customary international law on the law of treaties.” The Vienna Convention itself provides the following guidance to those interpreting treaties:
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
57
light of its object and purpose.” International law states an interpretive
method that, while starting with ordinary meaning, explicitly sanctions consideration of the framers’ purpose.
A literal textual interpretation of the treaty’s ordinary meaning suggests
its terms prohibit asteroid mining. However, purposive arguments—
particularly given the nature of asteroid mining as a business that tends to
facilitate space travel and exploration—generally point to an interpretation
that grants permission to private companies to mine asteroids.

pert, INVERSE (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.inverse.com/article/34935-luxembourg-s-asteroidmining-is-legal-says-space-law-expert (noting the explanation of the Russian and Brazilian
point of view on asteroid mining by space law expert Frans von der Dunk, that these countries
“don’t view these mining operations as meeting the non-ownership standards of the Outer
Space Treaty . . . .”).
54.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2.
55.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6.
56.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/
s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm.
57.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
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A. Textual Interpretation Prohibiting Asteroid Mining
Under the Outer Space Treaty
A private asteroid mining company most likely qualifies as a nongovernmental entity under the OST and is thus bound by the prohibitions
58
stated in Article II. Article VI of the OST, as noted above, mandates that
“States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space . . . whether such activities are carried on by
59
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities . . . .” A preliminary question to answer before assessing whether the prohibitions stated in
Article II preclude asteroid mining is whether a private asteroid mining
company would fall within this category specified in Article VI. Based on
the plain meaning of the treaty, as well as the potential for circumvention of
the terms of the treaty under an alternate interpretation discussed below, the
answer is likely yes.
To begin, a private company literally meets the plain meaning definition of “non-governmental entity” as an entity that is not the government. If
not a private company, what non-governmental entity capable of spaceflight
60
could the framers of the OST have had in mind? Moreover, an alternative
interpretation could open the door to unscrupulous government circumvention of the treaty, allowing nations to dodge responsibility under international law by forming shell corporations and then freely engaging in activi61
ties otherwise prohibited by Article II. Even assuming the private entities
engaging in asteroid mining were truly private, they would remain under the
“authorization and continuing supervision” of the government under whose
62
laws they are incorporated. Numerous academic commentators have pointed out that “[s]tates are unable to authorize their non-governmental entities
to conduct activities that international law prohibits the state, itself, from
63
conducting.” The actions of private space companies, then, must create

58.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2 (prohibiting “national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”).
59.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6.
60.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6.
61.
See Ricky J. Lee, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty: Prohibition of State Sovereignty, Private Property Rights, or Both?, 11 AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 128, 130 (2004) (noting that
Article II must have at least some application to private entities, or else “it may be possible for
States to circumvent the prohibitions contained in the Outer Space Treaty simply by ‘privatising’ the contravening activity.”).
62.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6.
63.
Leslie I. Tennen, Enterprise Rights and the Legal Regime for Exploitation of Outer
Space Resources, 47 U. PAC. L. REV. 281, 287 (2016); see also C. WILFRED JENKS, SPACE
LAW 201 (1965) (stating that “what is forbidden to a State is not permitted to a chartered company created by a State or to one of its nationals acting as a private adventurer . . . .”).
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“international responsibility” for sovereign parties to the treaty; a violation
64
of terms by the former is a violation by the latter.
Having determined that the prohibitions in Article II likely apply to private companies, the next question is whether asteroid mining is a prohibited
means of “national appropriation [of a celestial body] by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” First, it
seems far more likely than not that asteroids fall within the scope of celestial bodies defined by this treaty. The Oxford Living Dictionary defines “celestial” as “[p]ositioned in or relating to the sky, or outer space as observed
65
in astronomy.” This points to a rather all-encompassing definition that
would seem to include all bodies beyond the terrestrial scope of Earth capable of astronomical observation and study; asteroids are plainly bodies of
matter in space that are observable from Earth.
66
The treaty uses the phrase “the moon and other celestial bodies,”
which might support an ejusdem generis inference that the celestial bodies
envisioned by the treaty must be moon-like; that is to say, a celestial body
must be very large and in predictable orbit around a planet or star, including
planets and moons, but excluding asteroids and comets. However, this more
exclusive definition would create a celestial line-drawing dilemma given
67
that asteroids can become moons and asteroids can have their own
68
moons. This difficulty, coupled with the broad definition of “celestial,”
points to a broad definition of “celestial body” that includes asteroids.
The crux of the question, then, is whether asteroid mining as an activity
constitutes “national appropriation . . . by means of use or occupa69
tion . . . .” To “appropriate” something means to “take exclusive posses70
71
sion of,” or to “[t]ake (something) for one’s own use . . . .” In the case of
64.
But see Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37
FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 351 (1969) (suggesting that the treaty “appears to contain no prohibition regarding individual appropriation or acquisition by a private association . . . .”); see also
Wayne N. White, Jr., Real Property Rights in Outer Space, PROC. 40 COLLOQUIUM ON L.
OUTER SPACE 370 (1998) (arguing that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits territorial sovereignty but does not prohibit private appropriation).
65.
Celestial, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES: ENG., https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/celestial (last visted Nov. 28, 2018); see also Celestial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/celestial (last visited
Nov. 28, 2018) (“of or relating to the sky of visible heavens”).
66.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2.
67.
See Mars Moons, NASA, https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/moons/mars-moons/in-depth
(last updated Mar. 29, 2018) (noting that the moons of Mars, Phobos and Deimos, “may be
captured asteroids.”).
68.
See 243 Ida, NASA, https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/small-bodies/asteroids/243-ida/
in-depth (last updated Dec. 5, 2017) (noting that Ida is the first asteroid found to have its own
moon).
69.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2.
70.
Appropriate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/appropriate#h2 (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
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the OST, “national” modifies “appropriation[,]” illustrating that exclusive
use of celestial objects that is sovereign in nature constitutes a violation of
72
the treaty. A plain reading of the text of Article II indicates that “use or
occupation” is one avenue through which a country can engage in national
appropriation and, due to Article VI, that use or occupation can be the prod73
uct of a private company’s actions.
The passage of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness
Act endorses an interpretation that extraction of space resources by commercial actors is a use that does not amount to a claim of sovereignty, ab74
sent a claim of sovereignty by the actor’s host nation. Congress stated in
the Act that, “by enactment . . . the United States does not thereby assert
sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over . . . any ce75
lestial body.” In making this disclaimer, Congress treated making a claim
of sovereignty as a necessary component of achieving national appropriation of a celestial body. It gave private actors permission to exploit celestial
resources, subject to the authorization and supervision of the federal government, “in accordance with the international obligations of the United
States,” while disclaiming that this amounted to a claim of sovereignty or
76
jurisdiction. In other words, Congress effectively interpreted the OST to
prohibit only national appropriation by claim of sovereignty and by use or
occupation, an interpretation it understands to be in conformity with international law.

71.
Appropriate,
OXFORD
LIVING
DICTIONARIES:
ENG.,
https://
en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/appropriate (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
72.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2.
73.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 2, 6.
74.
The passage of this Act may in and of itself constitute a violation of the Outer
Space Treaty: the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally Wrongful Acts
states, “There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is
not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or
character.” Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, at 54 (2001). The commentary to this Article states that “[c]ertain obligations may
be breached by the mere passage of incompatible legislation.” Id. at 57. On the other hand,
given circumstances in which “it is open to the State concerned to give effect to the legislation
in a way which would not violate the international obligation in question[,]” then “whether
there is a breach will depend on whether and how the legislation is given effect.” Id. In this
case, the Act at least pays lip service to conformity with international obligations when it disclaims that it is an assertion of sovereignty: it states that Congress did not understand this Act
to amount to “sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or ownership
of, any celestial body.” U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No.
114-90, § 403 129 Stat. 704, 722 (2015). This disclaimer may well place this Act in the latter
category envisioned by the commentary to the Draft Articles, that the violation depends on
how the Act is given effect. This in turn requires a more thorough reading of the Treaty itself.
75.
U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, § 403.
76.
U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, § 403.
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The more persuasive textual interpretation of Article II of the OST
points toward the opposite conclusion. The disjunctive nature of Article II
suggests that national appropriation can occur either by “claim of sovereign77
ty,” or by “use or occupation . . . .” Under this interpretation, a private
company could certainly violate the terms of the OST through use or occupation of a celestial body.
The counterargument to this interpretation is based more on experience
with the treaty than the terms of the document itself. First, some use or occupation of celestial bodies, whether by sovereign governments or by private industry, has not been legally contested over the course of the OST’s
existence. The United States, the U.S.S.R., and China have all “soft-landed”
on the moon, placing astronauts or lunar rovers on the surface, thus occupying, if only temporarily, the surface of a celestial body specifically enumer78
ated by the OST.
Moreover, as noted in the House Report prior to passing the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, “[t]he United States, Russia, and
Japan have all removed, taken possession, and used in-situ natural resources. These activities have never been protested by a State party to the
treaty or judged in a court of law to be in violation of the Outer Space Trea79
ty.” The OST, by its own terms, condones some use of celestial bodies by
sovereign governments. Article IV states, “[t]he moon and other celestial
bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peace80
ful purposes.” While military use of space and celestial objects is clearly
verboten, the implication of this provision is permission for peaceful use. It
is certainly accurate that the “use or occupation” of a celestial body has not
previously amounted to a per se violation of the treaty. The argument that
asteroid mining does not violate the OST, then, seems to be that use or occupation alone is not enough; violation requires an additional claim of sovereignty.
However, a lack of prior implementation or legal enforcement does not
foreclose the interpretation that some kinds of use or occupation by a private
actor could amount to violation of the treaty, even absent the assertion of
sovereignty or jurisdiction. Moreover, given the history of partnerships be81
tween the commercial space sector and sovereign governments, an interpretation making a claim of sovereignty necessary to national appropriation
by private use creates a loophole large enough to swallow all the prohibi-

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2.
Connor Simpson, China Becomes Third Country to Ever ‘Soft-Land’ on the Moon,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 14, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/chinabecomes-third-country-ever-soft-land-moon/356151/.
79.
H.R. REP. NO. 114-153, at 8 (2015).
80.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4.
81.
See supra Section I(b) (noting the history of financial partnerships between private
space companies and sovereign governments).
77.
78.
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tions stated in the OST. For example, the colonization of Mars by a private
company is an action that would likely violate the treaty as it currently
stands in that it would almost by definition require exclusive possession of a
82
celestial body that is meant to be the “province of all mankind.” However,
were colonization not accompanied by the explicit assertion of national sovereignty or jurisdiction, it would be permissible under the U.S. interpretation of the OST.
The degree of occupation and use also might well exceed previous examples in the history of the OST. Asteroid mining is perhaps a more fleeting
occupation than a permanent colony, but if the asteroid mining industry becomes a fully mobilized component of the new space economy, the degree
of extraction and use would far exceed the scattered lunar samples in terms
of volume, making those a tenuous precedent upon which to rely. These arguments based on experience with the OST do not rely on the terms of the
treaty anyway. Focusing on the plain meaning of the text, asteroid mining
by a private company, even if unaccompanied by a claim of sovereignty, violates the OST.

B. Asteroid Mining is in Line with the Purposes of the
Outer Space Treaty
Despite the preceding plain text reading, asteroid mining by private
83
companies squares with the purposes of the OST. A major purpose of the
treaty is to maintain the international character of space, to ensure that the
vast realm beyond Earth’s atmosphere remains “the province of all mankind[,]” and that the benefits of space exploration flow to all states “irre84
spective of their degree of economic or scientific development . . . .” This
Note argues that asteroid mining is an enterprise that is in the interest of all
mankind and brings benefits to all nations regardless of their current state of
development.
Commercial asteroid mining is private, profit-driven in character, and
arguably distinguishable from the more wholly scientific objectives of sov-

82.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 1. For more detailed explanation as to why a
Mars colony would likely violate the Outer Space Treaty, see Michael J. Listner, A Legal
Look at Elon Musk’s Plan to Colonize Mars, SPACE REV. (July 17, 2017), http://
www.thespacereview.com/article/3286/1; Caroline Haskins, The Legal Battle to Colonize
Mars, OUTLINE (Mar. 15, 2018), https://theoutline.com/post/3739/mars-colony-settlementspacex-elon-musk-trump?zd=1&zi=mmhbqxps.
83.
The Vienna Convention, Article 31, explicitly sanctions the consideration of the
purpose of a treaty in the interpretation of the document—this seemingly condones purposive
interpretation in a way that is arguably more out of vogue in the American judiciary. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 57, art. 31.
84.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 1.
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85

ereign space agencies like NASA. However, given the waning funding for
86
and role of sovereign space agencies, the development of the asteroid mining industry could deliver important benefits to all mankind that simply may
not otherwise come into existence. Asteroid mining could contribute to the
common good by producing benefits that have global effect, as they pertain
to the survival of the human species. These include enhanced asteroid diver87
88
sion capability and facilitation of climate change mitigation measures.
Advancements in technology to address the challenges of asteroid mining
and improving our collective scientific understanding of the universe could
89
bring as yet unknown benefits to all humanity. Finally, by reducing costs
of launch, asteroid mining could effectively open the door to the space
economy to nations that might otherwise find this prospect cost90
prohibitive.
The purposive arguments presented above in favor of the permissibility
of asteroid mining are not immune to criticism. The United States, Luxembourg, and whatever other nations are able to attract asteroid mining companies in the future would benefit disproportionately from asteroid mining
in the form of taxable corporate income and job creation. For the roughly
99% of countries currently without asteroid mining companies within their
borders, there would be no share of those benefits, which are effectively being extracted from a space that is meant to be the “province of all man91
kind.” Moreover, given that spaceflight is currently the exclusive province
of a few wealthy, industrialized nations, there is at least an argument to be
made that asteroid mining may accelerate the gap between the first and third
world rather than act as a rising tide that lifts all ships.
However, an argument that disproportionate benefit makes asteroid
mining at odds with the purpose of the OST misunderstands the treaty and
overlooks the nature of the benefits asteroid mining could deliver. First, the
OST endorses the view that human space travel and exploration, as a gen-

85.
See NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., supra note 43, at 6 (stating agency
objectives).
86.
See Lossner, supra note 26; see also Marina Koren, NASA’s Next Frontier is Washington, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.govexec.com/technology/2017/02/
nasas-next-frontier-washington/135553/.
87.
See KECK INST. FOR SPACE STUDIES , supra note 5, at 11–12 (describing how asteroid mining would enhance asteroid diversion capabilities).
88.
See TELLER ET AL., supra note 48, at 7 (noting that technology decreasing the cost
of launch would facilitate solar insolation modulation).
89.
See supra Section I(c).
90.
See supra Section I(a). for why asteroid mining reduces cost of launch. Moreover,
this growth of the “space population” is in the interest of asteroid mining companies since that
is their future market for in-space materials. See Heath, supra note 26.
91.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 1.
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92

eral proposition, is in the interest of humanity. Asteroid mining would facilitate space travel by reducing launch costs and would do so in an indiscriminate manner—assuming private asteroid mining companies are able to
sell propellant to entities from all nations, as would surely be in their best
93
interest.
Second, while the financial fruits of the endeavor may reflect preexisting terrestrial inequality, many benefits of asteroid mining would, by defini94
tion, extend to all mankind. The OST does not demand that all benefits derived from outer space be shared equally across nations, but rather that outer
space activity “should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespec95
tive of the degree of their economic or scientific development . . . .” Improved asteroid diversion technology and facilitation of climate change mitigation measures provide benefits pertaining to the continued habitability of
96
Earth that are spread evenly across the globe. Scientific and technological
97
developments, depending on their content, could eventually flow to all nations by way of sale through global markets. Because asteroid mining could
simultaneously facilitate space travel and bring substantial benefits to all
mankind—notwithstanding an uneven distribution of those benefits—it is in
harmony with the stated objectives of the OST.

III. A New International Framework to
Govern the Space Economy
Asteroid mining creates tension within the OST as an activity that is
prohibited by the treaty’s terms but largely in line with the treaty’s purpose.
As such, the OST should be modified to allow for greater certainty and predictability with respect to asteroid mining. The possibility that asteroid mining could be illegal under international law likely disincentivizes entry into
this new endeavor by adding risk and uncertainty. This section outlines what
a revised framework should look like. First, the law governing space should
remain international in nature to further the interests of peaceful cooperation
and facilitate dispute resolution. Second, this framework should present
minimal regulatory barriers for entry given the benefits that asteroid mining
could bring to all mankind. The development of whaling law provides a use-

92.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, pmbl. (recognizing “the common interest of
all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes . . . .”).
93.
See supra Section I(c).
94.
See supra Section I(c).
95.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, pmbl.
96.
See KECK INST. FOR SPACE STUDIES, supra note 5, at 11–12 (noting that asteroid
mining could have a possible effect on asteroid diversion technology); TELLER, supra note 50,
at 7 (stating that reducing cost of launch could facilitate solar insolation management).
97.
See NASA’s Journey to Mars, supra note 42.
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ful historical example of how norms and rules for the asteroid mining industry could evolve in a way that facilitates efficient governance of this endeavor.

A. The Desirability of an International Framework
The preservation of space as a zone governed by international law, in
contrast to a system predicated on national jurisdiction, is desirable in that it
promotes peace, facilitates dispute resolution, and allows for more coordi98
nated efforts in addressing issues relevant to all entities operating in space.
As illustrated by the recent legislative activity in the United States and Luxembourg, the risk of inaction is the resultant domination of the extraterrestrial environment by individual nations rather than by international agree99
ment. It would take only minor changes to the OST to resolve some of the
ambiguities in the status quo and help bring the benefits of asteroid mining
to humanity as a whole. A revision of this treaty rather than a wholesale
abandonment of the agreement—whether that abandonment is in fact or
merely in practice—would better maintain the international character of
space.
The OST reflects Cold War era concerns about the militarization of
100
space. Private companies, now ascendant in the growing space economy,
simply do not have the military capacity or intention of sovereign governments. In short, the factual backdrop for the signing of the OST has
changed. One straightforward means of authorizing private companies to
extract space resources would be to revise the OST to clarify that the language in Article II prohibiting national appropriation does not apply to private companies. This could be achieved by simply adding a sentence to the
end of Article VI: Under the revised treaty, companies shall remain under
the supervision of the countries in which they are based but are not capable
of national appropriation by use or occupation. This revision would create
something of a line-drawing problem given the partnerships between sover101
eign space agencies and private companies, as well as a possible loophole
by which unscrupulous nations could take advantage of the corporate form.
Additional safeguards might be necessary to prevent this possibility. This
revision could, however, promote peaceful coexistence and uniformity in
space law, as well as create certainty as to the legality of asteroid mining by
private companies.
98.
The OST, supra note 9, espouses many of these ideals in the preamble.
99.
The passage of the U.S. Space Launch and Competitiveness Act and the Loi de 20
julliet 2017 illustrate that given lack of international consensus, there is a risk that individuals
nations will act unilaterally in accord with the interpretation of the OST most favorable to
their interests. For more on the enactment of these laws, see supra notes 51–52.
100.
Not only military activity, but the nuclear arms race specifically helped prompt the
signing of the OST. See Krause, supra note 36, at 46; Grush, supra note 8.
101.
See supra Section I(b).
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Another possibility is to create a new set of international rules for extraction of space resources. Assignment of such property rights could take
102
the form of a first-come, first-served system or it could depend on an
103
Earth-side registration process. Arguably, extraction is different than the
forbidden uses enumerated in the OST in that it is a temporary occupation
and not inherently an exercise of military might or the flexing of sovereign
104
muscle. While the United States and Luxembourg both interpret asteroid
105
mining to be legal under the existing treaty, the promulgation of rules
governing the endeavor would add clarity as to the legality of the enterprise.
This approach would have the advantage of treating sovereign actors and
private companies alike, but would require more substantial revision of the
OST, or a new international agreement altogether.
An amended OST or a new treaty governing the extraction of space resources would have the benefit of maintaining the peaceful order of space.
While admittedly the product of a different era, the post-national and peaceable foundation of the OST is still desirable in an international environment
where many nations are armed to the proverbial nuclear teeth. Peaceful use
of outer space is a laudable objective and one served most effectively by international agreement rather than by competing national claims of sover106
eignty.
An international system would also facilitate dispute resolution. In a
borderless and extra-jurisdictional realm like outer space, a system predicated on national sovereignty and ownership is not instructive as to whose

102.
Wayne White, Proposal for a Multilateral Treaty Regarding Jurisdiction and Real
Property Rights in Outer Space, SPACE FUTURE (2001),
http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/proposal_for_a_multilateral_treaty_regarding_
jurisdiction_and_real_property_rights_in_outer_space.shtml (“Entities may occupy and use
locations in outer space on a first-come, first-served basis, so long as said occupation and use
will not interfere with other entities [sic] activities.”).
103.
Alison Morris, Note, Intergalactic Property Law: A New Regime for a New Age, 19
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1085, 1112 (2017).
104.
In Article 4, the Outer Space Treaty forbids “establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications . . . .” See articles cited supra note 82 for a more detailed explanation
as to why a permanent government-sponsored colony would violate art. 2 of the Outer Space
Treaty.
105.
The language used in these laws, suggests that the legislative bodies of both countries interpreted the laws being passed as in conformity with international law. See supra
notes 51–52 for more discussion of the specific language these laws used to indicate their conformity with international law.
106.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Antarctic Treaty, both examples of
treaties governing areas outside of the jurisdictional reach of any sovereign, emphasize the
fundamental importance of peaceful use. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea pmbl.,
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (stating the desirability of a treaty that
will “promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans . . . .”); Antarctic Treaty pmbl., Dec. 1,
1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (noting the objective that Antarctica “shall not become
the scene or object of international discord . . . .”).
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laws—or whose choice of law rules—would control in the event of disputed
title of an asteroid or the commission of a tort between two actors from dif107
ferent nations. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the
“UNCLOS”) established the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(the “ITLOS”) as a means of providing a venue in which similar disputes
108
could be adjudicated between actors with conflicting legal regimes. Outer
space has a great deal of similarity to the high seas: both are vast, both are
easily treated as a non-appropriable international commons, and both are an
109
in-between space in the sense of existing between bodies of terra firma.
An international mechanism like ITLOS ought to be established for resolving space disputes such that parties can seek a neutral arbiter to resolve conflict and laws can be uniformly applied to all entities irrespective of their
110
country of origin.
Finally, an international system could more easily allow for cooperation
between nations and private entities in addressing issues that affect the
spacefaring community as a whole. The emergence of space debris and the
use of nuclear power sources in space are examples of developing issues
111
that bear on the ease and safety of space travel for all. Left to national
governments or individual corporations, it seems plausible that lack of over112
sight could result in a tragedy of the commons. By contrast, an interna-

107.
The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, is currently not instructive in this respect,
either: it provides that states retain jurisdiction over their objects and personnel (art. 8), and
that they are internationally liable for damage to another state party (art. 7).
108.
See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, supra note 106, at Annex VI; see also
Helmut Tuerk, The Contribution of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to International Law, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 289 (2007).
109.
See M.J. Peterson, The Use of Analogies in Developing Outer Space Law, 51 INT’L
ORG 245, 252 (1997) (noting that the vastness and in-between quality of the seas and space
made this analogy appealing); Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier:
The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 363, 374 (2004)
(noting that the decision to treat outer space as a nonappropriable international commons
arose by analogy to the high seas).
110.
ITLOS has been used relatively few times since coming into existence, leading
some commentators to conclude that its effectiveness is limited. See Rosemary Rayfuse, The
Future of Compulsory Dispute Settlement Under The Law of the Sea Convention, 36 VICT. U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 683, 709–10 (2005) (noting that ITLOS has heard relatively few cases,
has proven to be “circumscribed in scope,” and that “if the past is prologue, the future does
not look overly bright.”). On the other hand, other commentators have interpreted the brief
history of ITLOS as supporting a more positive vision of the tribunal’s future, and that its
mere existence has been a beneficial development. See Tuerk, supra note 108, at 316 (noting
that the tribunal’s record “does not compare unfavourably to that of other international judicial bodies in the initial stages of their existence[,]” and that “a choice of forum . . . is more
beneficial than harmful . . . .”).
111.
See David Tan, Towards a New Regime for the Protection of Outer Space as the
“Province of All Mankind,” 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 145, 149–55 (2000).
112.
See Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
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tional framework is well-suited to consider the problems of the space ecosystem in a way that transcends national boundaries. The UNCLOS Preamble, for example, demonstrates an awareness that “problems of ocean space
113
are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole.” The compelling interests of peace, uniformity, and cooperation in outer space illustrate the desirability of an international framework to govern asteroid mining; to tweak rather than jettison the existing law. The resulting clarity and
predictability would incentivize asteroid mining through reducing legal risk
and uncertainty.
A counterproposal to an international framework is a system in which
nations assign property rights according to domestic law. It would be possible to take a terra nullius approach to property rights relating to celestial
114
bodies. In the Western Sahara advisory opinion, the International Court of
Justice defined terra nullius as “a legal term of art employed in connection
with ‘occupation’ as one of the accepted legal methods of acquiring sover115
eignty over territory.” For a nation to peaceably acquire sovereignty
through occupation, the land must be “terra nullius—a territory belonging
116
to no-one—at the time of the act alleged to constitute the ‘occupation[.]’ ”
This legal approach was prevalent during the colonial era: explorers and
emigrants acting in the name of European sovereigns declared ownership of
117
territory by right of discovery and occupation. By authorizing U.S. citizens to extract materials from asteroids through the Commercial Space
Launch Competitiveness Act, the United States has started down a path in
which property rights in space flow from the jurisdiction of individual sov-

L. 589, 592 (2011) (noting that “[w]ithout legal consequences, including appropriate international sanctions for treaty violations, little international influence exists to compel spacefaring nations to find a viable solution to this problem.”).
113.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 106.
114.
Numerous commentators have suggested that something along the lines of terra
nullius, adverse possession, or right of first possession—all sounding in domestic law—ought
to apply to celestial resources. See, e.g., Brandon C. Gruner, A New Hope for International
Space Law: Incorporating Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles into the 1967
Space Treaty for the Colonization of Outer Space in the Twenty-First Century, 35 SETON
HALL L. REV. 299, 344–56 (2004); Lauren E. Shaw, Asteroids, the New Western Frontier:
Applying Principles of the General Mining Law of 1872 to Incentivize Asteroid Mining, 78 J.
AIR L. & COM. 121, 143–54 (2013).
115.
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 79 (Oct. 16).
116.
Id. (italicization in original).
117.
See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823) (“[D]iscovery
gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy . . . .”); Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, ¶ 33 (Austl.) (“International law recognized . . . occupation of
territory that was terra nullius as [one] of the effective ways of acquiring sovereignty.”).
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ereign nations. Luxembourg has taken a similar approach through its own
119
legislation.
There are some notable advantages to this approach. The absence of an
international policing or enforcement mechanism in space arguably points
in favor of regulation by nations with spaceflight capacity. Given the gener120
ally acknowledged challenges of enforcing international law, one might
wonder whether domestic governments might be better positioned to monitor and control private entities based within their borders. A nation-centric
approach would also likely incentivize investment in asteroid mining,
prompting countries and private actors to invest more aggressively so as not
121
to lose the new space race. Assuming, as this Note does, that the development of the asteroid mining industry is in the interest of humanity as a
whole, this approach has some appeal.
However, a nation-centric, first possession framework has drawbacks
that highlight the desirability of an international governance regime for asteroid mining. First, the experience of colonization was one that prompted
122
conflict between colonizers. The peaceful character of space is one of the
great achievements of the OST, and it should not be jettisoned. Second, a
regime characterized by national actors could spark a race to the bottom
with respect to domestic regulation, leading to the same “flags of convenience” problem present in the maritime context as asteroid mining and
spaceflight companies relocate to avoid taxes, labor and safety standards,
123
and tort liability. An international framework, by contrast, could more

118.
See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-90, 129 Stat. 704.
119.
See Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de
l’espace [Law of July 20, 2017 on the exploration and utilization of space resources],
MÉMORIAL A N° 674 DE 2017 (enacted July 28, 2017) (Lux.).
120.
See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Enforcing International Law, ASIL INSIGHTS, Jan. 22,
1996, (providing an overview of challenges of enforcement of international law).
121.
See Ross Myers, The Doctrine of Appropriation and Asteroid Mining: Incentivizing
the Private Exploration and Development of Outer Space, 17 Or. Rev. Int’l L. 183, 185
(2015) (suggesting that “the doctrine of appropriation, a modified version of the rule of capture, is a reasonable doctrine to incentivize the development of space. . .”).
122.
Examples of wars touched off or exacerbated by colonial conflict include the War
of the Spanish Succession, the French and Indian War, and, to some extent, World War I. See,
e.g., HEW STRACHAN, THE FIRST WORLD WAR, VOLUME 1: TO ARMS 1–35 (2003) (discussing German Weltpolitik and the Moroccan crises as causes of World War I).
123.
In the maritime context, the “flags of convenience” problem refers to the selection
of a country of registry (or flag) based on the least burdensome tax and regulatory scheme.
See Brian Baker, Flags of Convenience and the Gulf Oil Spill: Problems and Proposed Solutions, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 687, 695 (2012) (noting the advantages of flags of convenience for
owners of vessels as “(1) easy registration of maritime vessels, (2) lower taxes, (3) reduced
operating expenses, and (4) freedom of control by the country of registry.”) (quoting Richard
J. Payne, Flags of Convenience and Oil Pollution: A Threat to National Security, 3 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 67, 69 (1980)). The consequences of the flags of convenience problem in maritime
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easily prevent this problem by facilitating the creation of uniform standards
for labor, safety, and liability, making relocation to under-regulated states a
less attractive prospect. The drawbacks of a system governed by individual
nations, in conjunction with the advantages of a global system illustrated
above, point to the desirability of a revised framework governing asteroid
mining that is international in character.

B. A System with Minimal Regulatory Barriers to Entry
Whatever approach is chosen to resolve the ambiguities in the OST
ought not to be overly restrictive or create burdensome regulatory obstacles
for private asteroid mining companies. Substantial regulation could discourage investment and hamper the development of an already capital-intensive
124
and high-risk industry. The ideal regulatory system for asteroid mining
should maintain an international character for the reasons described in the
previous section but should not impose cumbersome regulation on asteroid
mining companies at this stage in their development. Rather, allowing
norms to develop over time through the resolution of disputes between asteroid mining companies would likely result in the most efficient regulatory
system and would be more attractive to companies and nations that might be
tempted to disregard the treaty.
The development of whaling custom offers insight into the extent to
125
which “property rights may arise anarchically out of social custom.” The
analogy to asteroid mining is strong in that both are extractive, high-risk,
and capital-intensive industries that take place in what is effectively mare
126
liberum (free sea). Herman Melville in Moby-Dick suggests the whaling
industry was not governed by a “formal whaling code,” but rather that the

law include substandard working conditions, safety concerns, and difficulty assigning tort liability to individual owners of vessels. See H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships
and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139,
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Outer Space Domain, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 103, 175 (2017) (noting that flags of convenience
could prove to be a problem for the space economy).
124.
See Kamil Muzyka, The Common Burden of “Spacemankind,” SPACE REV. (July
10, 2017), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3279/1 (“Forcing . . . small space prospecting companies into an unfavorable license and reaping huge royalties is not a best future for a
developing new space industry.”).
125.
Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from
the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 83 (1989) [hereinafter Ellickson, Hypothesis].
For a more thorough discussion of this theory, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991),
126.
See generally HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA (David Armitage ed., Richard
Hakluyt trans., Liberty Fund 2011) (1609) (arguing for freedom of navigation of the high seas
as a global commons); see also Muzyka, supra note 124 (mentioning briefly whaling in connection with asteroid mining).
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“fishermen have been their own legislators and lawyers in this matter.”
Over time, the custom developed that “I. A Fast-Fish belongs to the party
fast to it [and] II. A Loose-Fish is fair game for anybody who can soonest
128
catch it.” While Melville concedes that “the commentaries of the whalemen themselves sometimes consist in hard words and harder knocks—the
129
Coke-upon-Littleton of the fist,” he also notes that this code is “universal,
130
undisputed law applicable to all cases” that prevents “vexatious and vio131
lent disputes [arising] between the fishermen.” By and large, whalers were
able to govern themselves by crafting norms over time that suited their
needs.
Robert Ellickson, in his Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms, cited
the development of whaling norms as supporting the idea that, “when people are situated in a close-knit group, they will tend to develop for the ordi132
nary run of problems norms that are wealth-maximizing.” Ellickson defines wealth-maximizing norms as those that minimize the sum of
transaction costs and deadweight losses that the members of a group objec133
tively incur. Those involved in the group activity are likely to develop
rules in a utilitarian manner, preferring “bright-line rules that would elimi134
nate arguments to fuzzy rules that would prolong disputes.” The few asteroid mining companies currently in existence are not only a close-knit
135
group under Ellickson’s definition, but are best positioned to create rules
that will give rise to greater clarity and reduce transaction costs due to their
proximity to and soon-to-be-developed experience with the business of asteroid mining. Rules like these would incentivize asteroid mining through
greater legal clarity and predictability, thus facilitating the delivery of asteroid mining’s benefits to all mankind.
The UNCLOS ratification debate helps illustrate why a more substantial
regulatory regime might prove counterproductive for the international
community. One of the primary reasons cited by American opponents of ratification is that accession to the treaty would subject American mining
companies “to the whims of an unelected and unaccountable bureaucracy
and would force them to pay excessive fees to the International Seabed Au-
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133.
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134.
Id. at 87.
135.
See id. at 84 (noting that “informal social control” is a key element of a close-knit
group).
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thority for redistribution to developing countries.” While other commentators have dismissed these concerns as “pure nonsense,” noting that these
same companies favor accession to the treaty for the sake of having a clear
137
legal claim to mined minerals, it is easy to imagine that a similar scheme
of bureaucratic redistribution in the context of asteroid mining might be disregarded by the United States. A decision by nations leading the way on asteroid mining to opt out of a treaty would for all practical purposes cripple
future treaty efforts. A key advantage of the proposed regulatory framework
described in this Note is a practical one: it would offer the attractive prospect of legal clarity without an international bureaucratic bogeyman, making it more likely that key national stakeholders like the United States would
sign on.

Conclusion
Maintaining the international character of outer space while allowing
private companies to develop their own governing norms under a slightly
revised OST would preempt the outbreak of a new race by sovereign governments to colonize space; create greater certainty for those undertaking
the enterprise of asteroid mining; and permit the development of an efficient
system tailored to maximize returns on celestial investment. The asteroid
mining industry has the potential to confer benefits on all mankind as a
means of facilitating space travel, spurring the development of science and
technology, mitigating the potential for a calamitous asteroid impact, and
facilitating climate change mitigation efforts. As such, it is in the interest of
all nations to revise the OST to allow greater certainty in this endeavor.
138
While the “entire unimaginable infinity of creation” is still out of reach
based on our existing physics and engineering capabilities, asteroid mining
is a critical step in beginning to harness celestial resources and more fully
explore the intricacies of the universe around us.
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